GEOFF BENNETT: Well, as the war with Iran escalates, the U.S.

and Saudi Arabia today announced a landmark nuclear deal that would give the kingdom access to American technology for a civilian nuclear energy program and could allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium.

AMNA NAWAZ: The U.S.

describes the deal as helping to launch an era of American nuclear renaissance.

But critics say the deal could lead to further nuclear proliferation.

Nick Schifrin has more.

NICK SCHIFRIN: He is one of the Middle East's youngest leaders, expected to lead for the next half-century the world's largest oil exporter.

And, today, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman achieves one of his long-held goals, a civilian nuclear deal with the United States.

It's a 30-year deal for exclusively American companies to build nuclear infrastructure in Saudi Arabia, including, if a joint study concludes it's commercially viable, a uranium enrichment facility.

"These agreements uphold the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation, while relying on the world's best nuclear technology and scientists designed right here in the United States," Secretary of Energy Chris Wright today said in a statement.

"Thanks to President Trump, the American nuclear renaissance is under way."

The deal comes as the U.S.

is escalating its attacks in Iran in a war whose goal President Trump describes as preventing Iran from having the ability to create a nuclear weapon.

DONALD TRUMP, President of the United States: Any site where they're even thinking about nuclear, we will be hitting it very, very powerfully.

NICK SCHIFRIN: But the deal provides Saudi Arabia U.S.

nuclear technology, even though it does not include what's known as the U.N.

nuclear agency's additional protocol of monitoring and inspections, and even though bin Salman in 2018 did not rule out eventually building nuclear weapons.

NORAH O'DONNELL, CBS News Anchor: Does Saudi Arabia need nuclear weapons to counter Iran?

MOHAMMED BIN SALMAN, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince (through translator): Saudi Arabia does not want to acquire any nuclear bomb.

But without a doubt, if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.

SEN.

EDWARD MARKEY (D-MA): This is about a clandestine nuclear weapons program on their ground.

NICK SCHIFRIN: That's led to a yearslong debate in Congress, where some Democrats describe the kingdom as a threat to nuclear proliferation.

SEN.

EDWARD MARKEY: If we put in place an agreement that allowed for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing on the land of Saudi Arabia, it would be potentially disastrous.

NICK SCHIFRIN: The deal is also opposed by Israeli leaders, including one of the leading opposition candidates in the upcoming elections, Naftali Bennett.

NAFTALI BENNETT, Former Israeli Prime Minister (through translator): The nuclear agreement taking shape with Saudi Arabia over Israel's head is a severe strategic failure that endangers our security.

Enrichment of nuclear material on Saudi soil could lead to a regional nuclear arms race and a dangerous loss of control.

NICK SCHIFRIN: But the State Department, in a may letter to Markey, said the U.S.-Saudi deal includes a bilateral safeguards agreement to be implemented with the International Atomic Energy Agency that provides for the application of additional safeguards and verification measures to provide added confidence in the exclusively peaceful use of material and equipment.

BERNARD HAYKEL, Princeton University: It's been a very big goal for the Saudis.

For a long time, they have wanted to have nuclear power to be able to release more oil for exports.

NICK SCHIFRIN: Bernard Haykel is a Princeton professor of Near East studies and a Saudi expert.

He argues, since the kingdom started developing green energy, nuclear energy no longer makes any sense.

BERNARD HAYKEL: When it comes to power generation, it's 10 times more expensive than solar power because they are blessed with an unbelievable amount of sunshine.

So, frankly, if you're looking to generate power to liberate more oil from electricity generation, it makes much more sense to use a combination of solar, wind, and gas, natural gas.

NICK SCHIFRIN: And yet bin Salman is getting the deal he wanted and tying the kingdom to the United States for the next generation.

For the "PBS News Hour," I'm Nick Schifrin.

GEOFF BENNETT: For perspective on this, we turn now to Jon Wolfsthal.

He was an adviser to the Biden administration on U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation and was on the National Security Council staff during the Obama administration.

He's now a fellow at PAX sapiens.

That's a nonprofit focused on preventing foreseeable global catastrophes.

Great to have you here in the studio.

JON WOLFSTHAL, Former Biden Administration Adviser: Thanks for having me.

GEOFF BENNETT: So, based on what's been reported, is this a good deal for the U.S.?

JON WOLFSTHAL: I haven't seen the details under the hood of this deal, and until I do, I'm really going to wait and reserve judgment.

The proof's always in the pudding.

And so what are the conditions in the deal?

Do they actually bind the Saudi Arabians to only buy U.S.

technology in perpetuity?

What are the criteria by which we will judge whether or not they will get to do domestic enrichment?

And, most importantly, what sort of access will the International Atomic Energy Agency have throughout Saudi Arabia in case we find something suspicious?

GEOFF BENNETT: The administration says this is about helping Saudi Arabia develop civilian nuclear power.

How quickly can civilian enrichment capability become a pathway to a weapon?

JON WOLFSTHAL: So right now, the Saudi Arabians don't have the ability to produce their own uranium enrichment equipment.

They don't have the technology.

And if they wanted to buy it from the United States, we don't currently have a viable commercial technology.

So we're still several years away from being able to provide it or the Saudi Arabians being able to build it.

So this is not a weapons program with a flip of a switch.

If the Saudi Arabians are trying to pull the wool over people's eyes and go nuclear, it's many years down the road, but something we have to be watchful for.

GEOFF BENNETT: When the Saudi crown prince says that, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will do the same, how confident can the U.S.

be that Saudi enrichment would remain exclusively peaceful?

JON WOLFSTHAL: I think we have to be extremely skeptical that that's the case, one of the reasons I think the agreement should not authorize enrichment in Saudi Arabia.

And there are options beyond that.

The Saudis could invest in a U.S.-based facility.

There could be a multinational facility somewhere else.

But one of the reasons that you don't want a Saudi Arabia-based facility is because they have said, if Iran goes nuclear, they will too.

I'm also very concerned, however, that the Saudis have relationships with Pakistan that has a nuclear weapons program.

And they could buy equipment from China, which has a nuclear weapons program.

So the question is not, do they do business with us and nobody else, is, if they do business with us, are they less likely to develop a nuclear weapon if they do business with the Chinese or the Pakistanis?

GEOFF BENNETT: And if this deal goes forward with weaker safeguards than previous U.S.

governments had demanded, what precedent does that set?

What stops Egypt or Turkey or some other regional power from saying, hey, if Saudi Arabia can do this, we want to be able to do the same?

JON WOLFSTHAL: I think there are two immediate implications.

One is, the Obama administration, we negotiated an agreement with the United Arab Emirates that said no enrichment, no reprocessing, and you had to have the additional protocol.

But it also said, if you negotiate another deal with another Middle East state that isn't as good, we get to go back and renegotiate.

So the UAE is calling the Trump administration today, I guarantee it, and saying we want another look at this.

And the other is, of course, that if the U.S.

is saying, well, this is the best we can do, other states, whether it's China, Russia, Pakistan or elsewhere, are going to say, well, if the U.S.

doesn't set a high bar, why should we?

GEOFF BENNETT: The U.S.

on the one hand is using military force to prevent Iran from maintaining enrichment capability, and then on the other hand is allowing Saudi Arabia to develop one, effectively.

How does the U.S.

government justify that distinction?

JON WOLFSTHAL: I don't know.

I wouldn't be able to do it.

Under the Obama administration, there was very limited, curtailed enrichment in Iran, and we did not allow enrichment in Saudi Arabia.

I think what the Trump administration will likely argue -- and I think there's a valid point to it -- is, if the Iranians think the Saudi deal is so advantageous, we will negotiate the same deal with Iran, that if they forego their own domestic enrichment, if they only do it in joint projects with the United States with our safeguards on it, then perhaps we could have a discussion.

But that's not what the Iranians are holding out for.

They're saying, it's our enrichment under our terms no matter what.

And that's something that the United States under President Obama, Biden, and Trump have said is not acceptable.

GEOFF BENNETT: We have got about a minute left.

What happens next?

Congress technically has a role to play here.

JON WOLFSTHAL: That's correct.

In fact, the agreement has to sit in front of Congress for 90 days of continuous session.

Under normal circumstances, that's about six months.

It looks like, however, the Trump administration is going to try to jam this through both this Congress, so that they can give approval to Saudi Arabia for enrichment in the -- on the kingdom in the rest of their term, within the next two years.

And I think Congress has to weigh in here, and the question will be, how serious are the questions they're going to ask, and how responsive is the Trump administration?

GEOFF BENNETT: Many more questions to come.

We will have to have you back.

Jon Wolfsthal, thanks again.

JON WOLFSTHAL: Thanks so much.